This essay explores how economic theory and historical inquiry were brought together for one of the first times in modern political thought in Books II and III of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. It shows how the theory of capital found in Book II provides a perspective for thinking about historical development and political institutions that is in sharp contrast with the historical record traced out in Book III. Smith's solution to the problem of reconciling economic theory and history lies (...) in a complex understanding of the nature of rational economic behaviour and how it has been affected by uncertainty and institutional development in human history. Embedded in Smith's political economy is not only a new theory of economic life, but a new political understanding of the importance of history to contemporary political life. (shrink)

In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and distinctive in giving equal attention to deep metaphysical questions concerning the (...) mind and to the discoveries and theories of modern scientific psychology. It will be of interest to any reader with a basic grounding in modern philosophy. (shrink)

Changes in pupil size can reflect social interest or affect, and tend to get mimicked by observers during eye contact. Pupil mimicry has recently been observed in young infants, whereas it is unkno...

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments (...) against both claims. (shrink)

The practice of coercive measures in psychiatry is controversial. Although some have suggested that it may be acceptable if patients are a danger to others or to themselves, others committed themselves to eliminate it. Ethical, legal and clinical considerations become more complex when the mental incapacity is temporary and when the coercive measures serve to restore autonomy. We discuss these issues, addressing the conflict between autonomy and beneficence/non-maleficence, human dignity, the experiences of patients and the effects of coercive measures. We (...) argue that an appeal to respect autonomy and/or human dignity cannot be a sufficient reason to reject coercive measures. All together, these ethical aspects can be used both to support and to reject a non-seclusion approach. The total lack of controlled trials about the beneficial effects of coercive measures in different populations however, argues against the use of coercive measures. (shrink)

This paper considers a possible national cultural and scientific synthesis which failed to take place: namely the integration of the Central European theoretical physicist Erwin Schrödinger into the primarily experimental orientations of the Oxford physics of the 1930s. We also consider the effect of the Oxford social and intellectual atmosphere generally, incluing the persistence of previous traditions which undervalued Science relative to the Arts, and University research relative to tutorial provision in the Colleges. The Oxford situation is then briefly contrasted (...) to that which Schrödinger later found in Dublin between 1939 and 1956, and which was to have a significantly more productive outcome. (shrink)

We argue that on logical grounds the constructivist algorithms mentioned by Quartz & Sejnowski (Q&S) do not resolve the learning paradox. In contrast, a neural network might acquire a more powerful structure by means of phase transitions. The latter kind of developmental mechanism can be in agreement with the constructivist manifesto.

The Luck Argument is among the most influential objections to the main brand of libertarianism about metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility. In his work, Alfred Mele [2006. Free will and luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press] develops - and then attempts to defeat - the literature's most promising version of the Luck Argument. After explaining Mele's version of the Luck Argument, I present two objections to his novel reply to the argument. I argue for the following two claims: (1) Mele's (...) reply is either otiose or undermined by his own defense of the Luck Argument from a different objection and (2) Mele's reply turns out to lack the form required to engage the step of the Luck Argument it targets. Having shown that the failure of Mele's novel attack is overdetermined, I close by defending a different (and, I believe, decisive) objection to the Luck Argument - which, as it happens, lurks right under Mele's nose. (shrink)

Previous statements concerning the reduction of possible parity and time reversal choices for electromagnetic quantities are amplified for the sake of clearer understanding.

Femina in line 28 has nagged me subconsciously for years. I have now belatedly realized that it sabotages the poet's prudent disclaimer: it is not women in general who are in question, but only those not ruled out of bounds by stola and uittae. The repetition of the word in the following verse, where it means, as the opposition to uiri indicates, ‘the female sex’, only serves to underline its inappropriateness here. Cristante's defence of the anaphora, that it ‘ribadisce la (...) necessità dell'insegnamento, introducendone la giustificazione’, sets up an unwanted connection: lines 25–8 are strictly parenthetic to the main argument, as indeed is signalled by the truly functional anaphora of femina in line 29, whose effect is blurred in the text as transmitted. The form of the couplet, typical of Ovid, dictates that what is wanted is a variation on nil nisi lasciui, e.g. nec or, better, non proba. The source of the intrusive femina is not far to seek, though how precisely it ousted the original reading I do not pretend to guess. (shrink)

Human rights and theology: An essential debate Human rights form an essential element of the new Constitution of South Africa. Can Christians take part in the debate on human rights? A model will be proposed called 'Analogy and difference’, which indeed makes it possible and desirable to do so. Although not founded essentially on Scripture or theology, analogies for the three basic principles of human rights — freedom, equality and participation — can be found in the Christian tradition. However, the (...) difference between the Christian tradition and the tradition of the Enlightenment has to be taken into account. Thus, the Christian can critically enter the debate on human rights, not to fill the concepts with Christian meaning, but to achieve a new ethical consensus. (shrink)

The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true (...) or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic. (shrink)

s div class="title" a terTwo Notions of Being: Entity and Essence s /div a ter - Volume 62 - E. J. Lowe.

This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will--a "two-way" power which ...

E. J. Lowe; The problems of intrinsic change: rejoinder to Lewis, Analysis, Volume 48, Issue 2, 1 March 1988, Pages 72–77, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/48.2.7.